Merge pull request #340 from wneessen/bug/339_fix-spelling-errors

Fix spelling errors
This commit is contained in:
Winni Neessen 2024-10-16 10:41:41 +02:00 committed by GitHub
commit c903f6e1b4
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4 changed files with 7 additions and 7 deletions

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@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ const (
// IETF draft. The IETF draft is more lax than the MS spec, therefore we follow the I-D, which // IETF draft. The IETF draft is more lax than the MS spec, therefore we follow the I-D, which
// automatically matches the MS spec. // automatically matches the MS spec.
// //
// Since the "LOGIN" SASL authentication mechansim transmits the username and password in // Since the "LOGIN" SASL authentication mechanism transmits the username and password in
// plaintext over the internet connection, we only allow this mechanism over a TLS secured // plaintext over the internet connection, we only allow this mechanism over a TLS secured
// connection. // connection.
// //
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ const (
// SMTPAuthPlain is the "PLAIN" authentication mechanism as described in RFC 4616. // SMTPAuthPlain is the "PLAIN" authentication mechanism as described in RFC 4616.
// //
// Since the "PLAIN" SASL authentication mechansim transmits the username and password in // Since the "PLAIN" SASL authentication mechanism transmits the username and password in
// plaintext over the internet connection, we only allow this mechanism over a TLS secured // plaintext over the internet connection, we only allow this mechanism over a TLS secured
// connection. // connection.
// //
@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ const (
// //
// SCRAM-SHA-X-PLUS authentication require TLS channel bindings to protect against MitM attacks and // SCRAM-SHA-X-PLUS authentication require TLS channel bindings to protect against MitM attacks and
// to guarantee that the integrity of the transport layer is preserved throughout the authentication // to guarantee that the integrity of the transport layer is preserved throughout the authentication
// process. Therefore we only allow this mechansim over a TLS secured connection. // process. Therefore we only allow this mechanism over a TLS secured connection.
// //
// SCRAM-SHA-1-PLUS is still considered secure for certain applications, particularly when used as part // SCRAM-SHA-1-PLUS is still considered secure for certain applications, particularly when used as part
// of a challenge-response authentication mechanism (as we use it). However, it is generally // of a challenge-response authentication mechanism (as we use it). However, it is generally
@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ const (
// //
// SCRAM-SHA-X-PLUS authentication require TLS channel bindings to protect against MitM attacks and // SCRAM-SHA-X-PLUS authentication require TLS channel bindings to protect against MitM attacks and
// to guarantee that the integrity of the transport layer is preserved throughout the authentication // to guarantee that the integrity of the transport layer is preserved throughout the authentication
// process. Therefore we only allow this mechansim over a TLS secured connection. // process. Therefore we only allow this mechanism over a TLS secured connection.
// //
// https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7677 // https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7677
SMTPAuthSCRAMSHA256PLUS SMTPAuthType = "SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS" SMTPAuthSCRAMSHA256PLUS SMTPAuthType = "SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS"

2
eml.go
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@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ ReadNextPart:
return fmt.Errorf("failed to get next part of multipart message: %w", err) return fmt.Errorf("failed to get next part of multipart message: %w", err)
} }
for err == nil { for err == nil {
// Multipart/related and Multipart/alternative parts need to be parsed seperately // Multipart/related and Multipart/alternative parts need to be parsed separately
if contentTypeSlice, ok := multiPart.Header[HeaderContentType.String()]; ok && len(contentTypeSlice) == 1 { if contentTypeSlice, ok := multiPart.Header[HeaderContentType.String()]; ok && len(contentTypeSlice) == 1 {
contentType, _ := parseMultiPartHeader(contentTypeSlice[0]) contentType, _ := parseMultiPartHeader(contentTypeSlice[0])
if strings.EqualFold(contentType, TypeMultipartRelated.String()) || if strings.EqualFold(contentType, TypeMultipartRelated.String()) ||

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@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ type loginAuth struct {
// See: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-murchison-sasl-login-00 // See: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-murchison-sasl-login-00
// Since there is no official standard RFC and we've seen different implementations // Since there is no official standard RFC and we've seen different implementations
// of this mechanism (sending "Username:", "Username", "username", "User name", etc.) // of this mechanism (sending "Username:", "Username", "username", "User name", etc.)
// we follow the IETF-Draft and ignore any server challange to allow compatiblity // we follow the IETF-Draft and ignore any server challenge to allow compatibility
// with most mail servers/providers. // with most mail servers/providers.
// //
// LoginAuth will only send the credentials if the connection is using TLS // LoginAuth will only send the credentials if the connection is using TLS

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@ -2163,7 +2163,7 @@ func SkipFlaky(t testing.TB, issue int) {
} }
// testSCRAMSMTPServer represents a test server for SCRAM-based SMTP authentication. // testSCRAMSMTPServer represents a test server for SCRAM-based SMTP authentication.
// It does not do any acutal computation of the challanges but verifies that the expected // It does not do any acutal computation of the challenges but verifies that the expected
// fields are present. We have actual real authentication tests for all SCRAM modes in the // fields are present. We have actual real authentication tests for all SCRAM modes in the
// go-mail client_test.go // go-mail client_test.go
type testSCRAMSMTPServer struct { type testSCRAMSMTPServer struct {